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RATIONALISING ANTICIPATORY BREACH IN EXECUTED CONTRACTS
RATIONALISING the doctrine of anticipatory breach is notoriously
diﬃcult. This may explain the complete lack of attempt by the UK
Supreme Court to address its conceptual diﬃculties in its recent judgment
in Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] 3 All E.R. 1082. It is
therefore of interest that the Singapore Court of Appeal in The “STX
Mumbai” [2015] SGCA 35; [2015] 5 S.L.R. 1 explained why the doctrine
of anticipatory breach can be applied to executed contracts (in the sense of
being fully executed by the innocent party). Whilst anticipatory breach ap-
plies similarly under English law, the English courts have never considered
the underlying justiﬁcation, save to say in a case with a partially executed
contract that “it would be very strange and hardly unworkable” if the inno-
cent party had to wait until the time for performance (Moschi v Lep Air
Services Ltd. [1973] A.C. 331, 356, per Lord Simon).
In The “STX Mumbai”, the appellant supplied bunkers to the respon-
dent’s vessel. Two days before payment was due, the appellant arrested
the vessel pursuant to an in rem writ based on the respondent’s alleged an-
ticipatory breach of the payment obligation. The appellant justiﬁed this ac-
tion by contending that the respondent’s failure to respond to a letter of
demand sent the day before evinced a clear intention not to be bound by
the contract. The demand for accelerated payment was in turn justiﬁed
by the insolvency of a company known as STX Pan Ocean Pte Ltd.,
which was named as the “group owner” of the vessel, and which supposed-
ly aﬀected the respondent’s ability to make payment. The respondent suc-
ceeded in striking out the appellant’s in rem action before the Assistant
Registrar, which was upheld by the Singapore High Court. The Court of
Appeal, however, reversed the decisions below. It identiﬁed as a prelimin-
ary issue whether the appellant should even be able to invoke the doctrine
of anticipatory breach since all the appellant’s other obligations under the
contract had been executed: the only obligation that remained was for the
respondent to make payment within 30 days. The Court of Appeal ruled
that not only was the appellant able to invoke anticipatory breach to an exe-
cuted contract, but that it was arguable that STX Pan Ocean’s insolvency
could render the respondent unable to pay for the bunkers. In particular, al-
though STX Pan Ocean was a third party, the Court of Appeal considered
that the precise facts of its ﬁnancial relationship to the respondent should be
canvassed at a full trial. As such, the appellant’s in rem action was not so
plainly and obviously unsustainable as to be struck out.
The traditional analysis of anticipatory breach is premised on the defen-
dant’s actual breach of an implied promise that the defendant would not
prevent the plaintiﬀ from performing its contractual obligations. On this
understanding, the doctrine would not apply to executed contracts where
the plaintiﬀ’s obligations have been fully performed, so that there is
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therefore nothing prevented by the defendant’s repudiation of its contrac-
tual obligations. This is the justiﬁcation used by the American and
Canadian courts to deny the application of anticipatory breach to executed
contracts.
In The “STX Mumbai”, the Court of Appeal oﬀered two justiﬁcatory
accounts for applying the doctrine of anticipatory breach to executed con-
tracts. The ﬁrst redeﬁnes the implied promise: the defendant impliedly pro-
mised that it would not act in such a manner so as to render the plaintiﬀ’s
performance of its obligation towards completion of the contract “an exer-
cise in futility” (at [45]). Thus, if the defendant announced that it would not
be performing its obligations before the time for performance, it would
have rendered the plaintiﬀ’s performance, whether already or still to be per-
formed, an exercise in futility, since the plaintiﬀ would not be receiving its
part of the contractual bargain. There is no reason why a plaintiﬀ who has
performed its obligations should ﬁnd itself in a worse position than a
plaintiﬀ who has not. As Carter forcefully argues, a “[plaintiﬀ’s] concern
about any conduct which materially increases the risk of non-receipt of
the agreed return for its performance is, if anything, more acute where
the [plaintiﬀ] has already provided that performance” (see Carter,
Carter’s Breach of Contract, 3rd ed. (Chatswood 2011), para. 7–80).
However, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that an implied promise ex-
planation may appear artiﬁcial. In Lord Atkin’s words, implied contracts
are “fantastic resemblances of contracts invented to meet the requirements
of the law” (United Australia Ltd. v Barclays Bank Ltd. [1941] A.C. 1, 29).
More relevantly, it would be a misnomer to call the doctrine “anticipatory”
breach when the implied promise explanation is premised on an actual
breach having taken place (see Tabachnik, [1972] C.L.P. 149, 151).
The Court of Appeal thus advanced an alternative account founded on
the defendant’s indication of a clear intention that it would not perform
its obligation under the contract. Where this has occurred, the Court of
Appeal held that this fact would support the ﬁnding that an actual breach
had in substance occurred although the time for performance had not
arrived. However, this analysis eﬀectively transforms an event that is not
a breach into a breach based on practical convenience and justice, with
the potential for disrupting the conceptual underpinnings of discharge by
breach itself. This may explain why Liu has argued against the use of
the expression “actual breach” under this analysis, preferring instead
the expressions “present breach” and “inferential breach” (see Liu,
Anticipatory Breach (Oxford 2011), 35–37).
The Court of Appeal’s alternative account could be extrapolated to ac-
quire greater doctrinal justiﬁcation. The defendant’s unequivocal indication
that it would not perform its obligations could be construed as a waiver of
its right to be held strictly to the bargain; that is to say, it was only liable to
perform its obligation at a later date and not earlier. Alternatively, it is a
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waiver of its right not to be called upon by the plaintiﬀ to perform earlier
than the stipulated date of performance. The waiver account is less strained
and artiﬁcial than the “implied promise” analysis and does not involve
transforming an event of no breach into one of breach. By this account,
owing to the defendant’s waiver, the plaintiﬀ can demand early perform-
ance, which is then breached when the defendant does not perform. The
shortcoming of the waiver account, however, is that it does not readily
apply to anticipatory breach by disablement and omission. Nor could it
be extended to cover anticipatory breach by impossibility of performance
caused by third-party acts, which was accepted as a type of anticipatory
breach in The “STX Mumbai”.
Returning to the court’s central ruling, there are strong policy reasons
justifying the application of the doctrine to executed contracts. First, it is
incorrect to think that the plaintiﬀ in an executed contract has suﬀered no
hardship if required to wait for actual breach to occur before suing. If the
defendant’s refusal to perform the contract is known to third parties, the
plaintiﬀ could suﬀer present losses, including incurring costs to obtain al-
ternative cash inﬂow and loss of public conﬁdence in its ﬁnancial health.
To a certain extent, the concept of anticipatory breach is informed by eco-
nomic eﬃciency. Thus, the doctrine operates in executory contracts to pre-
vent future waste, and in executed contracts to reduce losses. Allowing the
parties to settle their dispute early enables them to move on and plan their
future economic activities – a course of action which might minimise
related losses. Finally, making the plaintiﬀ of an executed contract wait
could in some cases render any eventual victory in litigation nugatory.
This was probably the appellant’s concern in The “STX Mumbai”. The re-
spondent was a one-ship company with no other substantial assets.
Arresting the ship before it departed from port would be the best way of
obtaining substantial relief. If the doctrine of anticipatory breach could
not be invoked in respect of an executed contract, the appellant would
have no basis to arrest the vessel while it was docked, and there was a
real risk that the respondent could evade full liability while having gained
the full advantage of the contract.
Signiﬁcantly, as has been pointed out, The “STX Mumbai” highlights an
important implication of anticipatory breach: it has the eﬀect of accelerating
payment through a claim for damages as opposed to debt (which claim has
not matured). This may be illustrated by the following facts: the paying
party is contractually obliged to pay on Day 10 but indicates irrevocably
his inability to do so on Day 3. Upon acceptance of his repudiation on
Day 3, the other contracting party, through the doctrine of anticipatory
breach, becomes entitled to call upon him to make full payment immedi-
ately. There is a certain irony that one’s honest communication of an inabil-
ity to pay triggers the maturing of that very obligation. Furthermore, unlike
an acceleration clause in loan contracts which may have debtor disciplining
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functions (e.g. ensuring the debtor’s proper accounting practices), the doc-
trine of anticipatory breach has the sole eﬀect of protecting that one creditor
who is entitled to invoke the claim from the point of “breach”. The doctrine
thus enables that creditor to “leap over” other creditors to enforce his “debt”
in the event of the debtor’s ﬁnancial distress. Contracting parties, especially
the debtor, should consider their options seriously before embarking on a
course of conduct that will trigger the doctrine of anticipatory breach in
this situation.
YIHAN GOH AND MAN YIP
School of Law, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178899. Email: yihangoh@smu.edu.sg;
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ESTOPPEL AND THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT 2002
WISHART v Credit and Mercantile Plc [2015] EWCA Civ 655 is an un-
usual priorities case. At its heart is an informal business partnership be-
tween two close friends: S and W. Together, the pair undertook a series
of property developments. In all their ventures, S took the lead on ﬁnancial
matters. With the approaching sale of a particularly lucrative development,
S and W considered how to spend their gains. W indicated that he would
like to purchase a residential property for himself and his family, and
entrusted the arrangements for the acquisition to S. W removed himself en-
tirely from the process, failing even to look at the contract of sale. As such,
he did not realise that S had inserted himself as the purchaser of the prop-
erty. Upon sale, W and his family moved into the property, oblivious to the
subterfuge. S then secured a loan of £500,000 on the property by way of a
legal mortgage in favour of C&M. The sum was promptly gambled away,
and S, now declared bankrupt, disappeared. C&M obtained possession of
the property and sold it for £1.1 million, using just under £700,000 of
the proceeds to recoup their loan and expenses. It was at this point that
W re-entered the narrative, appearing before the court to argue that, by vir-
tue of an overriding interest, he was entitled to the proceeds of the sale over
C&M.
W’s bid for priority failed due the court’s adherence to a little-used
nineteenth-century principle laid down in Brocklesby v Temperance
Permanent Building Society [1895] A.C. 173. Although this is not an au-
thority that has featured prominently in recent years, it was explicitly relied
upon in Thompson v Foy [2009] EWHC 1076 (Ch), at [142], and rests be-
hind the Court of Appeal’s decision in Abbey National Building Society v
Cann [1989] 2 F.L.R. 265, though the point was left untouched by the
House of Lords. The eﬀect of this principle is a simple estoppel: when
C.L.J. 21Case and Comment
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